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CHAPTER 9. Intersecting intelligence: exploring big data disruptions 
Xaroula Kerasidou, Katrina Petersen and Monika Büscher 
1. Introduction 
In September 2015, Rana Novack, a Syrian American advocate for refugees and 
civilians in conflict and founder of the Refugee Admissions Network Alliance, wrote 
an article in Wired magazine entitled “We should have seen this refugee crisis 
coming”. There, Novack berates the reactive approach taken to the escalating refugee 
crisis that first captured public attention when between January and March 2015 479 
refugees drowned or went missing in the Mediterranean sea (UNHCR 2015). Novack 
calls upon the IT community to ‘step up – big time’ and use its ability to analyse 







Such hopes that IT experts can construct machine or algorithmic ‘intelligence’ to 
analyse patterns, trends, anomalies within the vast amounts of data or ‘intelligence 
about’ people’s and objects’ everyday life, are widespread. They index complex 
intersections of different forms of intelligence and motivations for using them. 
As big data meets crises, commercial forms of intelligence mix with humanitarian and 
security intelligence, as well as emerging forms of grassroots collective intelligence 
created and shared through social networking technologies. For example, president 
Obama called for Silicon Valley and other private industry actors to build new 
donation platforms that leverage access to consumers and users of social media 
platforms to increase awareness of the refugee crisis in the US (Mattingly and 
Svoboda 2015). In London, computer programmers, entrepreneurs and investors came 
together during a Tech City event in order to develop new ideas around data. Their 
‘Refugee Aid App’ provides migrants with up-to-date information about where help 
might be found nearby, and it also enables charities to communicate with refugees 
based on their location (Silva 2015). Such support could be pivotal, as Markku 
Niskala, Secretary General of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC), suggests: disaster management is about “information as 
much as water, food and medicine or shelter” (as cited in Coyle and Meier 2009: 17). 
Indeed, technologies such as smartphones have become key tools that facilitate a less 
perilous journey for the refugees (Brunwasser 2015, Latonero 2016, Gillespie et al. 
2016). A ‘digital passage’ (Latonero 2016) is formed and inhabited through the 
exchange of personal messages between refugees, friends and family. But at the same 
time as this digital passage enables mobility and a mobilisation of social collective 
intelligence that can help coordinate refugee journeys, it contributes to a ‘datafication’ 
of the persons and the physical and communicative mobilities involved. The 
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refugees’, their traffickers’ and their networks’ everyday movements, 
communications and transactions become intelligence in their own right. Europol has 
started monitoring social media for human/refugee smugglers (Birnbaum 2015), and 
Frontex – the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders – has put out a (controversial) call for the design of smartphone 
apps and databases to track and manage refugees arriving in Europe (Taylor and 
Graham-Harrison 2016). 
There is an uneasy coming together of diverse computational and human intelligences 
in these intersections, and the ambiguous nature of intelligence – understood on the 
one hand as a capacity for perceiving, learning and understanding and, on the other, as 
information obtained for strategic purposes – marks complex relationships between 
‘good’ and ‘dark’ aspects of big data, surveillance and crisis management. 
As Kitchin (2014) observes, the use of machine ‘intelligence’ for big data analysis, 
including intelligence about mobile populations, constitutes disruptive innovation, an 
epistemological and political paradigm shift. There clearly are challenges, such as an 
erosion of privacy, freedom, equality and human rights (Lyon 2014, Graham and 
Marvin 2001, Büscher, Perng, and Liegl 2015). However, disruption also brings 
opportunity for hopeful transformations. New forms of digital humanitarianism 
(Meier 2015) and the social collective intelligence of self-organised refugee networks 
and community support groups are examples (Gillespie et al. 2016). For formal crisis 
management, too, there are many positive outcomes, including richer and faster 
situation awareness, increased agility, interoperability and capacity for anticipation 
and prediction. Yet, such humanitarian and community innovations and 
improvements to crisis management can also be seen as enacting problematic 
reconfigurations of global power and understandings of resilience that contribute to a 
hollowing out of societal structures in line with neoliberal ideologies (Burns 2015). 
Overall, the effects of big data in crisis management are ambiguous. 
These ambiguities are at the heart of our analysis in this chapter. Our discussion is 
structured around three themes emerging from an analysis of discourses on big data in 
crisis, including media reports, documentation of data processing procedures and a 
review of academic and popular literature on big data in crises. We begin by 
examining how big data is produced and how this constitutes a ‘datafication’ of life 
on the move for refugees. Here, we explore the effects of visibility/invisibility 
through datafication and frictions that arise between identification and 
subjectification. Our second focus draws attention to how the refugee crisis manifests 
a deepening of the transition from societies of discipline to societies of control 
through data. A key aspect of this are capabilities for anticipation and prediction of 
crises. A third focus on dataveillance allows us to discuss how democratising forms of 
producing and using big data come into conflict with an amplification of 
‘institutionalised individualism’ (Beck 1999) through neoliberal interpretations of 
freedom and responsibility in crisis. We conclude with a critical evaluation of the 
relationship between crisis and preparedness as seen through the lens of big data, 
crisis management and surveillance as constitutive rather than merely reflective of 
subject positions and realities.  
2. Datafication 
The infrastructures for communication and information exchange that Latonero 
(2016) describes have engendered a pervasive transformation of almost all 
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dimensions of human experience. Thrift shows how populations ‘increasingly 
function as a set of human pantographs, measuring out the world and themselves both 
at once’ as they go about their everyday life in ‘Lifeworld.Inc’ (2011:9). In crisis 
situations, another dimension of what Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013) call 
‘datafication’, takes hold. Datafication refers to the fact that ‘we can now capture and 
calculate at a much more comprehensive scale the physical and intangible aspects of 
existence and act on them’ (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, 97). In crisis 
management this has prompted experts to argue that ‘technology that provides the 
right information, at the right time, and in the right place has the potential to reduce 
disaster impacts’ (Koua et al. 2010: 255) and more recent arguments that finding the 
‘needles’ in the big data ‘haystack’ can provide ‘life-saving information for 
humanitarian organisations and disaster-affected communities’ (Meier 2015: 62). 
Although there is some critical engagement, seeing data as a key to understanding and 
saving the world has become common sense, an epistemology-ideology and politics 
driven by a deep belief in data as actionable knowledge. 
Datafication utilises meta-data, that is, information about information, such as the 
author’s language, location, communication patterns, preferences. Edward Snowden 
exposed how analysis of such meta-data can undermine privacy and civil liberties 
(Harding 2014). Although Snowden’s revelations shocked the world and prompted 
calls for a public debate on issues of privacy and transparency, regulatory decisions 
have since been taken that allow continuation of such surveillance trends, such as that 
of the UK’s investigatory powers tribunal (IPT) which deals with complaints about 
surveillance and the intelligence services, rendering legal the hacking of computers, 
networks and smartphones in the UK or abroad by the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHC) (Bowcott 2016). The power of a data centred epistemology-
ideology seemingly trumps concerns over imbalances between security, privacy and 
liberty. The refugee crisis and its recent escalation in Europe sheds an interesting light 
on this issue as debates on the importance of the control of external borders, the 
protection of “fortress Europe”, along with efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks 
have intensified calls for more and more security measures, security measures that 
rely on increased data. There are three aspects in particular that are revealing. 
First, there is a double dynamic to the generation of data in the refugee crisis. On the 
one hand, the two key agencies involved - Frontex and the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) – depend on data for their very activation. The founding regulations 
for these agencies explicitly stipulate that their provision of increased technical and 
operational support is to be given to Member States whose border management or 
asylum systems are confronted with specific and disproportionate pressure. Without 
data to capture the ‘disproportionate’ nature of the situation, these provisions cannot 
be mobilised. On the other hand, refugees themselves are said to benefit. As the 
Deputy High Commissioner Wendy Chamberlin suggested, “You have no protection 
if you are invisible. To get this kind of documentation is a basic form of protection, 
and services flow from that” (Microsoft Corporation 2011: 1). Thus, refugees, too, 
have a need to be registered. The UNHRC, for example, which provides humanitarian 
aid to refugees has based many of their data strategies upon making sure the refugees 
are known to those with the power to distribute aid. Refugees claiming asylum have 
their bio-data and other personal information gathered through interviews entered into 
the UN’s ProGres database and another database for biometric data, a necessary step 
for the provision of food, medicine, and other humanitarian services. Depending on 
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the national authorities, refugees may also have to register with local authorities and 
the UNHCR may be obliged to share personal data with them (Trilateral 2015). 
Secondly, this tracking and tracing of refugees has become a deeply ambiguous 
process in a world riven by political conflict, where ‘migration’ increasingly comes to 
be discussed in co-location with terrorism. For example, the first two themes 
discussed in the 17-18 December 2015 European Council’s meetings, were 
‘Migration’ and the ‘Fight Against Terrorism’. A drive towards datafication is visible 
in both, with the conclusions on migration calling for measures that ‘ensure 
systematic and complete identification, registration and fingerprinting, … to tackle 
refusal of registration and stem irregular secondary flows’; whilst the conclusions 
regarding the fight against terrorism state that there is an ‘urgency of enhancing 
relevant information sharing, notably as regards … ensuring the interoperability of the 
relevant databases with regard to security checks’ (European Council 2015). Within 
the meetings there were also calls for ‘systematic security checks’ to ‘address 
deficiencies in the functioning of hotspots … and further supporting Frontex and 
EASO’1 , as well as proposals for a new European Border and Coast Guard, which is 
controversial, as it can override member state’s powers (Peter 2016). 
Thirdly, at this juncture, control and security is being equated with visibility; and 
visibility with personal security. But how these individuals are made visible matters 
for both privacy and security, let alone the politics of conflating refugees, migration 
and terrorism. Working with specific data framing mechanisms affects how the causes 
and effects of disasters are identified and what elements and people are considered 
(Frickel 2008). For example, the different structuring frames for data processing 
presented by specific organisations involved in the 1984 Bhopal disaster2 determine 
whether it is seen as an Indian only disaster to be dealt with internally or as an 
international disaster with responsible parties spread as far as the United States. 
Changing the classification framing mechanism can change whether disaster recovery 
is considered complete or still on-going or whether what is relevant to consider are 
immediate chemical spills or future health problems (Fortun 2000). With the narrower 
national frame, it is an issue of individual health care, for the other it is a matter of 
national security. 
How we engage with data thus also produces, rather than merely describes, histories 
and futures (Fritzsche 2005), and data thus cannot be treated simply as intelligence 
about a situation. This is too often forgotten when data is equated with intelligence 
and seen to suffice to define solutions. The methods and decisions inherent in data 
production are made invisible. But datafication clearly is not just a matter of 
identification and intelligence, it is also a matter of subjectification. 
3. Societies of Control 
Information technology to manage, engage, and analyse big data are posited as 																																								 																					1	The	European	Commission	developed	a	‘“Hotspot”	approach	where	the	European	Asylum	Support	Office,	Frontex	and	Europol	will	work	on	the	ground	with	frontline	Member	States	to	swiftly	identify,	register	and	fingerprint	incoming	migrants”	(EU	Commission	2015:6)	2	In	December	1984,	a	Union	Carbide	India	Limited	(UCIL)	pesticide	manufacturing	plant	in	Bhopal	leaked	a	mixture	of	toxic	gases,	killing	between	2-4000	people	in	the	immediate	aftermath	and	significant	long	term	health	effects	for	hundreds	of	thousands	(Fortun,	2000),	classed	as	one	of	the	worst	industrial	disasters	in	the	world's	history.	
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carriers of innovations and solutions that can provide a clearer common operational 
picture for command and control in disasters, as well as help build resilient 
communities. As Coyle and Meier (2009) argue, disasters are often seen as crises of 
information, where it is vital to make sure that people know where to find potable 
water, how to ask for help, where their relatives are, or if their home is at risk; as well 
as providing emergency response and humanitarian agencies with information about 
affected populations. Such a quest for information for “security”, in turn, provides 
more than fertile ground for a quest for technological solutions, such as big data, 
which provide opportunities for the extended surveillance of everyday life. The 
assumption is that if only enough information could be gathered and exchanged, 
preparedness, resilience, and control would follow. This is particularly pertinent with 
regard to mobile populations (Adey and Kirby 2016). 
In the refugee crisis current at the time of writing, states and aid organisations are 
looking for a big data solutions, precisely because they are mobile. Surveillance 
studies have tracked a shift from discipline to control (Deleuze 1992; Haggerty and 
Ericson 2000; Lyon 2014) exemplified by the shift from monitoring confined 
populations (through technologies such as the panopticon) to using new technologies 
to keep track of mobile populations. Snowden’s revelations about data retention and 
sharing pursued by the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and 
the US National Security Agency (NSA) dwarf these concerns. Revealing the ultimate 
ambition of this collaboration during a visit to a joint communications monitoring 
station in the UK in 2008, Lt Gen Keith Alexander, head of the NSA, asked ‘Why 
Can’t We Collect All the Signals, All the Time?’ (MacAskill et al. 2013). A ‘collect-
all’ policy could create a live imprint of ‘the haystack’, that is, all ICT supported 
communications (in the world), to find ‘needles’ – terrorists and organised criminals 
with malicious intent, whose communication patterns are exceptional enough to 
‘trigger’ scrutiny. This is deemed necessary because terrorists may hide as ‘one in a 
million’ in amongst ordinary people (Crang and Graham 2007; Crampton 2015). 
There is a benign impetus to ‘collect all’, ‘just in case’. The city of Amsterdam, for 
example, is experimenting with techniques to use data to track people’s mobile 
phones within the impact area of a chemical accident to support incident management 
(Steenbruggen et al. 2013). But big data further escalates mobilities of control and 
control of mobilities, not only at the level of monitoring the discrete movements of 
individuals. 
Andrejevic and Gates (2014: 190) suggest that ‘the target becomes the hidden patterns 
in the data, rather than particular individuals or events.’ National and local authorities 
are not seeking to monitor individuals and discipline their behaviour but to see how 
many people will reach the country and when, so that they can accommodate them, 
secure borders, and identify long term social outlooks such as education, civil 
services, and impacts upon host community (Pham et al. 2015). Moreover, there is a 
search for patterns, as highlighted by Edward Snowden’s whistleblowing revelations. 
Analytic tools such as XKeyscore make analysis of volumes of data of unprecedented 
magnitude possible (Gallagher 2013). The technology enables live capture of up to 
75% of internet data for certain ‘trigger’ criteria, such as ‘one end foreign’ 
connections between people in the home country and abroad. But the capabilities of 
these systems are limited, undermining claims to be able to clinically focus only on 
‘needles’. To analyze the ‘haystack’, search has to ‘go shallow’, that is, it has to apply 
broad rules for selection, which means the ‘probability that information is being 
collected that is unrelated to people the NSA is really interested in (and who the 
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agency has FISA warrants and National Intelligence case files for) is fairly high’ 
(Gallagher 2013). 
Yet even if capacities to analyze the ‘haystack’ for ‘needles’ more adequately were 
available, there would be questions about the quality of the haystack, and the meaning 
of analysis. For ‘Big Data is not self-explanatory’ (Bollier 2010: 13 in boyd and 
Crawford 2012). Neither is big data necessarily good data in terms of quality or 
relevance (Lesk 2013: 87) or complete data (boyd and Crawford 2012). These 
concerns apply not only to the analysis of big data for state surveillance or 
commercial purposes. There are claims that we have reached ‘the end of theory’, 
because big data analytics are said to be able to reveal patterns more effectively than 
theory (Anderson, 2008), but apart from misconceiving the nature of scientific 
reasoning, such assumptions are undermined by uncertainties about the completeness 
and accuracy of data. When analysing social media data, for example, most 
researchers do not have access to the ‘firehose’, which contains all public tweets ever 
posted, but only to a ‘gardenhose’ (roughly 10 percent of public tweets) or a ‘spritzer’ 
(roughly one percent of public tweets), and boyd and Crawford argue that ‘Without 
taking into account the sample of a data set, the size of the data set is meaningless’ 
(boyd and Crawford 2012: 669). Furthermore, many techniques used by the state and 
corporations in big data analysis are based on probabilistic prediction, which brings 
‘profound ethical dilemmas’ (Mayer-Schönberger, in Heaven 2013: 35). Some experts 
are now ‘less worried about privacy and more worried about the abuse of probabilistic 
prediction’ [ibid.], because probabilistic techniques of triggering scrutiny are based on 
processes that are alien to human reasoning. 
Networked electronic technologies and companies such as Google and Facebook best 
exemplify this shift towards what Baumann might call ‘liquid control’, as users of 
such services voluntarily generate through their social activities the data that can then 
be ‘sucked up …, quantified and classified, making possible real-time tracking and 
monitoring’ (Lyon 2014: 4). In the context of the refugee crisis, technologies such as 
smartphones have become key tools that facilitate a less perilous journey for the 







Moreover, most aid agencies do mobile data collection which are increasingly 
connected to interagency sharing portals where partner agencies can access and 
update the data (Favell 2015). At the same time, these technologies produce new 
spaces of governing. 
The border agency Frontex has put out a recent call for designs for smartphone apps 
and databases to track and manage refugees arriving in Europe (Taylor and Graham-
Harrison 2016). This call sought ideas for how to address the concerns over a lack of 
situational control expressed by EU nations. Ideas include apps, biometrics and smart 
cards to track and control people both before they cross into Europe and once they 
arrive and continue to move around the Schengen countries. Smart-card based 
vouchers have been used in past refugee situations to provide financial aid in a way 
that does not require them to continually return to a base-camp to restock supplies (as 
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happens when physical goods are provided) but allows them to purchase what they 
need where they need it. At present in the Middle East with the current Syrian crisis, 
these vouchers and cards are encoded with digital identifiers so that their use can be 
tracked. The reasoning given is that this allows analysis of the underlying trends 
behind the movement of people and thus demand for resources can be monitored and 
forecast (Favell 2015; Marr 2015). The aim is to better target and deliver assistance to 
those in greatest need through community-based approaches (Trilateral Research and 
Consulting 2015). 
However, with these big data collections, the focus becomes not the individual’s 
behaviour but social and economic insecurities, vulnerabilities, and resilience in 
relation to the movement of such people. The shift acknowledges that what is 
surveilled is more complex than an individual person’s movements, communications, 
actions over time. The questions start to become: how are they doing what they are 
doing, what are the patterns, and how does that relate to larger social infrastructures, 
such as the prediction of needs for movement of resources to support the refugees or 
to identify aspects of vulnerability (such as single female lead households, their 
financial situation, water security, health, and education). This demands surveillance 
of a matrix of mobilities: of communities/populations, goods, money, services, and 
needs, among others. 
This also comes with a switch in humanitarian practices, from bringing aid of 
specified and assumed types to the victims instead to providing them with the ability 
to purchase goods specific to their needs on their own. Ironically, resilience, as an 
effect of this form of community tracing, becomes about making it possible for 
individuals to self-provide. It is a form of embedded neoliberalism (Joseph 2013). 
While seemingly avoiding the traps of exerting top-down power over people, the state 
does not yet have formal control over, and simultaneously providing support for self-
determination and choice to empower individuals for self-sufficiency rather than 
defining them as vulnerable and passive recipients of top-down protection (Meier 
2013), tying individual aid to mobile tracking puts refugees in a situation where their 
security is dependent upon individual choice and the private sector. Apart from 
disrupting traditional dynamics of responsibility for aid and protection, public-private 
sharing of intelligence brings new forms of dataveillance as we will discuss below.  
Before we turn to this, the fact that tracking also becomes a question of analysing data 
about the environment and its impact on people’s movements is worth noting. For 
instance, the UNHCR has tried to make sense of refugee mobility by examining wave 
height versus registered arrivals to Lesvos. By mapping on top of each other the 
average wave heights around Lesvos and the number of refugees registered upon 
arrival, they found a clear negative correlation: the choppier the sea, the lower the 
number of people arriving, and vice versa. Consequently, by looking at the state of the 
sea they can predict refugee mobilities (UNHCR 2016). We will return to this in our 
discussion.  
4. Power through data: From dataveillance to democratisation? 
Public-private collaborations in the sharing of intelligence generate questions 
regarding the role of private companies in facilitating and enabling dataveillance 
(Raley 2013). As we have seen above, sharing information with private companies is 
proposed as a key move to enhance security for refugees, but it also frequently comes 
to be framed as part of international concerns with security, as ‘migration’ is 
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discussed in co-location with terrorism. The 17-18 December 2015 European 
Council’s discusses the two in close proximity, implying links between everyday life, 
displacement, migration and terrorism. This is a false framing that is nevertheless 
frequently made, and one that draws commercial communications service providers 







Since the data is already being collected on a regular basis by ubiquitous private 
firms, it is thought to contain information that will increase opportunities for 
intelligence gathering and control and thereby security. This marks a shift from 
surveillance to ‘dataveillance’ (van Dijck 2014), where the impetus for data 
processing is no longer motivated by specific purposes or suspicions, but 
‘opportunistic’ discovery of anomalies that can be investigated. Benefits expected for 
crisis management include richer situation awareness, increased capacity for risk 
assessment, anticipation and prediction, as well as more agile response. 
However, such changes also reconfigure power relations between state, commercial 
operators, citizens and non-citizens, through transformations of privacy and 
accountability. The Snowden revelations made clear that the leading technology 
companies, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Skype, etc. were subject to the NSA 
and GCHC’s data demands, circumventing encryption and privacy controls of 
unwitting users (Gellman and Poitras 2013). Such practices create an imbalance of 
power, whereby data subjects do not know who holds how much data about them and 
for what purposes. For instance, Kennedy and Moss (2015) note that “the analysis of 
social media data is seen as a powerful new way of knowing publics and capturing 
what they say and do” (3). But they also note that these analytics tend to be dominated 
by private and state elites who have access to the necessary tools. In addition to the 
power relations being fostered, the result is often less privacy, increased social 
discrimination, and decreased trust as data is being shared beyond the original 
collecting agency (Andrejevic and Gates 2014; van Dijck 2014). In addition, the 
integration of multiple databases brings together disparate and fragmented data which, 
when integrated, can come to be seen as a ‘complete picture’, which is, however, 
inevitably and always incomplete (Amoore and de Goede 2008). 
There is always a ‘prism’ (van Dijck 2014: 202) in big data analytics. For instance, as 
illustrated by Rana Novack’s call at the beginning of this Chapter, in relation to 
crises, the presumption is often that knowledge about future risks is present in the 
data, that if only data had been consulted sooner, if only ‘‘the dots [had] been 
connected, the events could have been exposed and stopped’ (Amoore and de Goede 
2008:174). Infrastructure, both physical and logical, matters to the power and use of 
big data (Andrejevic and Gates 2014). Big data, even if it is constantly growing and 
changing shape, is a set of elements assembled for a reason, based in infrastructure, 
where the work of recording an (on-going or past) event makes “meaning by choosing 
and placing and pasting” elements together in relation to one another (Smith 2004: 7). 
Meaning is circumscribed and delimited through these relationships, with ethical 
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implications for how events becomes knowable, especially in relation to inclusiveness 
and neutrality. 
Yet, at the same time as power is exercised by the state and commerce, power is 
gathering from the bottom up in new ways. In disaster response, a dynamic interplay 
between publics and experts is captured by the concept of social collective 
intelligence; a disruptive innovative force that is challenging the social, economic, 
political, and organisational practices that shape disaster response.  
General policy trends point towards the need for community involvement, recognising 
the public as important and expert stakeholders in the coordination of response efforts 
and in the development of community resilience and adaptation. The humanitarian 
field has for some time now adopted this democratic approach. Many voices within 
the humanitarian sector welcome the new tools and innovative solutions that 
information technology, industry, and big data can offer (UN Global Pulse 2012; UN 
OCHA 2013; Meier 2015). Doing so switches the discourse from vulnerability, where 
there is a need for external protection mobilised from above to come in and rescue the 
refugees, to one of resilience, where self-sufficiency and autonomy are part of the 
equation (Meier 2013). 
While similar proposals from the EU were met with controversy (Taylor and Graham-
Harrison 2016), biometric technologies and other digital ways of delivering aid, like 
voucher cards, are already being used for Syrian refugees in countries such as Egypt 
and Lebanon, being thought of as data aggregation devices that enable effects and 
capacities, including a more dignified existence, greater choice, and support for local 
economies (Betts 2013). The UNHCR has even called for the refugees themselves to 
also develop their own data solutions and ideas (see Palmer 2014) as a way to help 
build their ideologies into the data infrastructures and thus bring their prisms into 
view.  This could create a richer situational awareness and a better ability to 
understand and deal with unfolding and future crises by supporting resilient 
communities through giving them the means of data sharing. 
But Burns (2015) finds that humanitarian staff often describe the “local communities” 
and “crowds” as the eyes, ears and sensors of UN staff, which does not index a 
genuine collaborative relationship. He states: ‘In	all	these	cases,	the	discourse	talks	of	putting	local	people	“in	the	driving	seat”	when	in	reality	the	direction	of	the	journey	has	already	been	decided’ (p. 48). Burns (2015: 42) also notes that this 









In some ways this constitutes the production of ‘liquid resilience’ – a deflection of 
risk to the individuals and communities affected. But there is an imbalance of power, 
with data locally produced, but produced in ways designed to fit into systems and 
structures already in place, where local individuals and communities have very little 
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say as to what matters or how data should be collected. So while they may be local 
sensors, the sensors are pre-programmed to see within a specific spectrum.  
Ruppert argues that: ‘Rather than an all-knowing state, what we have instead is a 
plethora of partial projects and initiatives that are seeking to harness ICTs in the 
service of better knowing and governing individuals and populations’ (2012: 118). 
However, as Chandler (2015: 9) argues, crowdsourcing of big data does not equate to 












Moreover, any understanding that might be supported is of a strange kind, because ‘ 
helps answer what, not why’ (Cukier and Mayer-Schönberger 2013). They state that 
‘often that’s good enough’. But is it? The basis of debates about the nature of big data 
is the onto-epistemological claim reified in ‘the needle in the haystack’ metaphor. It 
assumes a reality that exists out there, independent and external, which we are trying 
one way or another to unveil. Understandings like this limit critiques of big data and 
such technological advancements to issues of privacy with calls for transparency over 
data processing practices, of more unveiling, of better knowledge and understanding 
as the answer to such problems. Yet such an approach leaves us to question the very 
relationship between crisis and preparedness, crisis and response. This is not a 
rational, but a political relationship. Otherwise, why, even if there are predictable 
events (such as a refugee crisis) do people not prepare? 
Novack’s statement that ‘We have the technology—right here, right now—to create a 
new, agile, insightful model that will predict mass migrations and help us better serve 
displaced families even before they are displaced. We can do all this now’ sounds 
hollow when seen in the light of the fact that ‘we’ did know. OCHA and other 
humanitarian agencies routinely monitor the movement of people. In 2014 the number 
of people displaced by conflict and persecution increased by 8.3 million, reaching a 
total of 59.5 million worldwide (UNHCR 2015). Similarly, the use of big data 
analytics to establish a correlation between turbulent weather, rough seas and 
numbers of refugees embarking on a journey by boat seems, at best, naïve. Crises are 
often not a crisis of information. It is often not a lack of data or capacity to analyse it 
that prevents ‘us’ from preventing disasters or responding effectively. Risk 
management fails because there is a lack of a relational sense of responsibility. In her 
work on ‘technologies of humility’, or technologies that are designed to support 
collaboration, Jasanoff (2007) explores how we might find ways of framing data and 




Moreover, technologies designed to support collaboration (and contestation of data!) 
can support acknowledgement of the subjectifying impetus of data. Ruppert (2011: 2) 










Burns (2015) builds on this to investigates how within digital humanitarianism 
discourses, big data produce and perform subjects ‘in need’ (individuals or 
communities affected by crises) and a humanitarian ‘saviour’ community that, in turn, 
seek answers through big data. Big data should therefore 
be conceptualized as a framing of what can be known about a humanitarian 
crisis, and how one is able to grasp that knowledge; in short, it is an 
epistemology. This epistemology privileges knowledges and knowledge- based 
practices originating in remote geographies and de-emphasizes the connections 
between multiple knowledges. … Put another way, this configuration obscures 
the funding, resource, and skills constraints causing imperfect humanitarian 
response, instead positing volunteered labor as ‘‘the solution.’’ This 
subjectivity formation carves a space in which digital humanitarians are 
necessary for effective humanitarian activities (9-10).” 
Having the information, does not linearly translate into knowing, and acting upon this 
knowledge. Strathern (2000) reminds us that visibility also conceals and writes about 
‘the tyranny of transparency’ (2000). To study what can become hidden by making 
the information visible, is a case of attending to the asymmetries of who can 
predict/know and who can actually act/move/prepare, and how. Big data is caught in 
confusions over the nature of reality, responsibility and power. It has fallen into a 
common sense call for more ‘transparency’, where 
transparency has been politically and morally juxtaposed against secrecy, 
[when actually] there is a symbiotic relation between the two, for example, 
when decisions are made about what to disclose or when transparent data gets 
buried under volumes of data thus rendering it opaque (Birchall 2011). A 
politics of transparency must thus be understood in relation to a politics of 
secrecy, a relation that is also suggested in Strathern’s formulation of 
transparency. An answer thus does not reside in extending the boundaries of the 
explicit as this will not lead to greater transparency or trust in the state. Indeed, 
such a strategy would only legitimise the technology of power through which 
the state has constituted transparency and through which it seeks redemption. 
Indeed, calls for more disclosure of the same reinforces the virtue and moral 
rightness of the TA (Transparency Agenda) and its authority and effectivity 
(Harvey et al). Rather, a politics of transparency needs to include contestation 
of the knowledge practices and the kinds of realities that are both promoted and 
eclipsed by the TA …” (Ruppert 2015:13) 
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So big data is not just about knowing more. It could be, and should be, about knowing 
better, or about changing what knowing means, it’s an ethico-episteme-ontological-
political matter. The ‘needle in the haystack’ metaphor conceals the fact that there is 
no such thing as a reality that can be revealed. But realities are made through 
mediations and human and technological assemblages. Refugees’ realities of 
intersecting intelligences are shaped by the ethico-episteme-ontological politics of big 
data. 
5. Discussion 
This chapter explores ambiguous forms of emergent practices around big data use for 
crises in order to produce a set of questions and uncover a range of issues that might 
enable “better” ways of working with big data. Crisis response and management, 
especially in its convergence with big data analytics, is a particularly important site 
for such investigations, because it is here that exceptional transformations of security, 
privacy and liberty are driven with extraordinary energy. Specifically, ICT enhanced 
disaster management can enable data sharing and more efficient and flexible 
response, including more richly and dynamically informed communication, 
collaboration and coordination. Such effects are almost unethical to not pursue. 
However, it can also extend capabilities for intentionally or unintentionally unjust 
subjectification, data retention, disclosure of personal data in the interest of security, 
sharing data for the purpose of promoting certain public interests. This risks an 
extended, ethically dubious and even counter-productive securitisation of emergency 
response as it engenders a shift from concerns with all hazards and safety (a general 
concern with risk) to concerns of security (focused on dangers arising from the illegal 
actions of others). 
We discuss various ways in which the emergent practices around big data are 
amplified and transformed through current trends in IT innovation in crisis response 
and management. Combining big data with crisis situations frames complex socio-
political problems such as the refugee crisis that is current at the time of writing as 
problems of intelligence and information/data. By focusing on crisis it becomes 
possible to see how questions around data use need to shift from asking what is in the 
data to include discussion of how the data is structured and how this structure codifies 
value systems and social practices, subject positions and forms of visibility and 
invisibility – and thus forms of surveillance, and the very ideas of crisis, risk 
governance and preparedness. Practices around big data produce and perpetuate 
specific forms of social engagement as well as understandings of the areas affected 
and people being served. 
Big data could be a technology for collaboration in relation to the complex causes and 
consequences of disasters, heightening awareness of vulnerabilities and capacities for 
response, and fostering consideration of the distribution of risks. Moreover, by 
highlighting fault lines of injustice before disaster strikes, risk governance augmented 
by big data could raise hopes for the development of communities of risk (Beck, 
1999) and a more relational ethics of risk (Büscher et al. 2017), where ‘it would not 
take a hurricane to make visible the plight of the poor’ (Jasanoff 2007, 33) or a 
refugee crisis to highlight a need for integrated European and global responses to 
displacement, enabling planning for futures where risks are addressed in more richly 
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